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The potential effects of political regimes on economic growth have been intensely
analyzed. Starting with the work by Adelman and Morris [1967], economists have
concurred that the standard of living in a society is a direct result of the dynamic
interdependence of economic, political, and social forces. They admit the importance
of valid political structures and social cohesion for good economic health, in addition
to sound macroeconomic policies. However, several issues cause this accord to sink
into disagreement. The following are among the questions at the core of the debate: Is
the nature of political regimes (regime type) a significant determinant of economic
performance? In other words, does it matter whether the regime is democratic or
authoritarian? Or would sociopolitical stability, in fact, be what really counts?
Two broadly opposing views fail to reach a consensus on the authoritative an-
swers to these questions.1 Advocates of democracy regard political liberties to be nec-
essary to achieve sustained and equitable growth. In their view, democratic features
such as political pluralism, the system of institutional checks and balances, and the
periodic renewal of policymakers through elections protect the economic system against
abusive or predatory behaviors typical of most authoritarian regimes. The democratic
process is viewed as more suitable to economic prosperity because it can better nur-
ture civil liberties and secure property and contract rights. Consequently, it provides
agents with incentives to undertake investments and to seek to maximize welfare.
Democracy makes it possible for individuals to examine opportunity costs freely, to
engage in the entrepreneurial initiatives of their choice, and to benefit fully from the
fruits of their labor.
In opposition to that perspective is the proposition that democratic regimes ham-
per growth because of their short-term focus. According to adherents to that view,
elected officials tend to be shortsighted because they long for popular approval and
success in the next election, making them exceedingly receptive to all sorts of pres-
sure, and inclined to yield to calls for immediate consumption. Krueger [1974] argues
that actions by private pressure groups and lobbying can affect people’s perception of
the economic game. The market mechanism is held in suspicion, and resource alloca-
tion is considered to be the result of a lottery where lucky (successful) rent-seekers2 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
become rich while the poor are unlucky players excluded from the benefit of rent
seeking. The democratic process is therefore regarded as typically incapable of pursu-
ing policies needed to unleash the forces of economic growth because such policies
may limit political and civil liberties, which precisely defeats the democratic purpose.
This reduces investment and makes it difficult to achieve sustained growth. Hence
the process is a fundamental weakness of democratic regimes that, as suggested by
their critics, causes their economies to perform more poorly than authoritarian re-
gimes. The latter, on the contrary, are insulated from the constraints of redistribu-
tive politics and have enough elbowroom to enact optimal policies aimed at achieving
long-term growth. Also, as residual claimants to their countries’ national wealth,
autocrat policymakers (dictators) have an “encompassing interest” in furthering
growth through the provision of domestic tranquility and other public goods that
increase productivity and output and, as a result, their share of national income
[Olson, 1982; McGuire and Olson, 1996].
Democracy advocates reject this line of argument. They do not consider the some-
what rare experience of higher rates of growth under the authoritarian rule to be an
indication of any superiority over the democratic rule. For them, economic success
under autocracy is incapable of withstanding the test of sustainability because it oc-
curs in an inequitable environment, laden with repressed discontent. Frustrations
build up, gradually undermine the apparent sturdiness of the macroeconomy and,
ultimately, burst into flames of sociopolitical instability. This hampers long-run growth.
This outcome is avoidable only if, after the country has come through the early stages
of economic development, the polity manages to implement a transition toward de-
mocracy, like in South Korea and Taiwan. Democracy advocates also point to the
damages predatory or incompetent (anarchistic) authoritarian regimes have inflicted
on their countries historically. This holds true even for the rational (but self-inter-
ested) autocratic ruler who has eliminated anarchy and provides a peaceful order and
other basic public goods to tax-generating subjects to give them an incentive to keep
generating taxable income. The promises of these autocrats to foster long-run eco-
nomic performance are not absolutely credible because their planning horizon is not
indefinitely long. In extreme cases, an otherwise rational ruler who is led at a certain
point in time to fear for his regime’s longevity might end up behaving like a predatory
bandit (confiscation of private property, abrogation of contracts, etc.), with no con-
cern for the economic repercussions of his acts [Olson, 1993]. At the limit, the fact
that within the class of nondemocratic regimes, the poorly performing ones customar-
ily wreak havoc on their economies while substantially outnumbering the few highly
performing ones (such as most East Asian Tigers two decades ago), does little to help
the case of authoritarianism.
In retrospect, one distinguishing feature of the empirical literature on growth
and democracy is its lack of certainty with regard to the nature of the relationship. In
that respect, besides the two broad perspectives presented earlier in this study, there
is also a third viewpoint that casts doubt on the very existence of any relationship
between regime type and economic growth. What really matters, according to this
approach, is the effectiveness of policies implemented and the stability, rather than
type, of the regime. Theoretically, political instability creates uncertainty about the3 DEMOCRACY AND GROWTH: A RELATIONSHIP REVISITED
future orientation of governance and renders economic agents reluctant to engage in
projects that they have come to perceive as exceptionally risky. This causes private
resources in the economy (both physical and human capital) to expatriate and relo-
cate in less erratic environments, which hinders investment and growth.
The sources of the divergence still merit thorough investigation. This study re-
visits the issue in the context of the 1970s and 1980s.2 It introduces the concept of
initial democratic capital, and argues that several other factors, besides the type of
the political regime per se, contribute to the influence of the political economy on
growth. Among those factors, the nonlinearity of the growth/regime-type relation-
ship, the stability of the political regime, and the presence of an initial democratic
capital seem crucial. The findings show that the explanatory power of the neoclassi-
cal growth model adopted in this study is strengthened with the addition of proxies
for regime type, regime stability, the initial level of political rights, initial democratic
capital, the level of economic freedom, the stock of human capital, and country loca-
tion (that is, the various regions of the world where the 82 countries retained in the
sample are located3). The robustness of the relationships under study is also ana-
lyzed.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This paper implements a comprehensive approach to the analysis of the interplay
between regime type and economic growth. In addition to the types of political re-
gimes prevailing in the period of study itself, the political legacy from previous years
is also accounted for. The basic hypothesis is that regime type, whether democratic or
autocratic, is likely the result of a relatively prolonged institutionalization process
whereby the underlying structural arrangements become stabilized and effective [Hun-
tington, 1968]. Consequently, contrary to most studies, it is posited here that the
conceptualization of the regime-type/economic-growth relationship should go beyond
the assessment of the average level of democracy (or autocracy) over the period stud-
ied. It is important to detect accurately any political legacy a country might have
inherited from earlier periods. I refer to this historical background as the initial demo-
cratic capital.
Relevance of Initial Democratic Capital
This study is not the first to espouse the idea of accounting for political tradition,
although, as will be seen, the conceptualization and measurement of the political
tradition adopted here is different from previous research and is new to this litera-
ture. Other studies have looked at variables such as a nation’s colonial heritage to
determine the impact of the latter on the status of political freedom. Lipset et al.
[1993] finds countries that were British colonies to be more likely to have democracy
through the 1970s than countries formerly ruled by other colonial powers. But the
relationships are not significant for the 1980s. Barro [1996] argues that the former
possessions of Britain and Spain are substantially more democratic than are those of
France, Portugal, or other countries. However, he concludes that the breakdown among
different colonizers is irrelevant and colonial history is insignificant for democracy4 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
when measures of the standard of living (such as schooling and infant mortality) are
held constant.
Using the colonial experience as an indicator of a nation’s political tradition has
some intrinsic conceptual problems. Due to fierce competition among colonial powers,
a number of nations have experienced a succession of colonial administrations over
time. The fact that a competitor would prevail, usually after throwing its rivals out of
a disputed territory, does not necessarily imply that the losers left behind no impact.
Therefore, it might not be appropriate to attribute the entirety of a nation’s political
heritage before independence to the one predominant colonial ruler. Moreover, colo-
nial legacy varies widely across countries both in its attributes and its persistence.
Nations have been freed at different points over a fairly long span of time, from late in
the eighteenth century (the United States became independent in 1776) to very late
in the twentieth century (the former soviet republics became independent in the 1990s).
Differentiation on the basis of the length of the self-governance period seems war-
ranted when evaluating the impact of colonization on political freedom. This impact
is likely to fade as the period of self-governance extends over time. This may help
explain why, as reported earlier, Lipset et al. [1993] found colonial influence to be
significant in the 1970s but not in the 1980s. Another important point may be the
permeability of the ruler/ruled relationship (that is, the extent to which a colonizing
power cared to instill useful skills into those it colonized). It is possible that the former
British colonies were found to have benefited somewhat from their exposure to the
British democratic principles because they were administered in a way that allowed
them to learn and later take the first steps toward democracy. Or, alternatively, the
British may have left their colonies with a significant endowment of administrative
capacity, making it possible for the new nations to organize and operate in a cadre
more hospitable to democratic principles.4
This study develops the concept of initial democratic capital to represent more
accurately the impact of the political tradition of a nation on economic performance.
The starting point of this approach is its account of a country’s legacy of political
freedom inherited from the years immediately prior to the sample period (that is, the
years preceding the 1970s up to the two or three previous decades). These may have
been years of colonial rule, for example in the case of African countries that became
independent in the 1960s, or they may have been years of self-governance in the case
of countries that were emancipated relatively long before or have always been inde-
pendent. Therefore, the focus of inquiry is redirected away from the exclusive consid-
eration of the colonial heritage, and toward the representation of a nation’s “own”
political background, regardless of its source, which may or may not stem from colo-
nial legacy. Initial democratic capital is intended to capture the many instances when
a nation has been independent long enough to build its own (post-colonial) political
tradition.
Initial democratic capital is measured as the level of democracy in the sample
period’s first year. As an indicator of a country’s distinctive initial democratic endow-
ment, initial democratic capital is denoted either high (for a country that had democ-
racy in 1972) or low (for a country that was autocratic at that time). Political freedom
in a country that was a democracy at the start of the sample period is assumed to5 DEMOCRACY AND GROWTH: A RELATIONSHIP REVISITED
have been improving more or less steadily in the recent past. On the contrary, a
country that was autocratic in 1972 is likely to have failed to implement a democratic
tradition in the run-up to the period studied. The former is thus assumed to have
started the sample period with a high level of initial democratic capital, and the latter
with a low level of initial democratic capital. The higher the starting level of political
rights (or the higher the initial democratic capital), the stronger the democratic tradi-
tion accumulated in earlier years, the more favorable democracy is likely to be for
growth in the sample years (1972-1989).5 With this in mind, this analysis assumes
that cross-country differentials in growth rates may also be explained by early differ-
ences in democratic capital. This idea is similar to the neoclassical assumption of an
impact of early levels of national income on subsequent levels of national income,
which is the basis of the conditional convergence theory [Barro and Sala-í-Martin,
1995].
In addition to the types of political regime prevailing in the sample period and to
countries’ initial democratic capital, the following are accounted for as growth-im-
pacting factors:
• Nonlinearity of the regime-type/economic-growth relationship. Previous research
found that the type of political regime might have a different effect on growth
depending on the stage of economic development. Building on prior separate studies
by Jackman, O’Donnell, and Kurth, Lipset [1993] postulates that the relationship
is curvilinear (an N-shaped curve), which suggests the existence of an upper thresh-
old of economic development beyond which the chances for more democracy are
quite low. Other studies found that at low levels of political rights, an expansion
of rights stimulates growth; however, further expansion of political rights toward
the highest levels of democracy causes a relative erosion of the growth potential
[Barro, 1996; Comeau, 1997]. Arguably, enhanced political liberties trigger en-
hanced pressures to satisfy social and welfare demands and to redistribute na-
tional income, which would be detrimental to productive investments;
• Stability of the political regime. Among the determinants of economic growth,
the stability of the political regime may be as important as its type. Consequently,
a complete representation of the workings of the sociopolitical framework may
require, in addition to the regime-type proxy, a measure for sociopolitical insta-
bility as a complementary explanatory variable in the model.
The Model
The following production function is used:
(1) yt = At f(kt)
where y is output per capita, k is capital stock per capita, f is a neoclassical produc-
tion function exhibiting positive and diminishing marginal returns [Barro and Sala-
í-Martin, 1995], and At is an overall productivity factor. Assuming that y0 is the ini-
tial level of income, n is population growth rate, and s is investment in physical
capital (saving rate), the rate of growth of y can be formulated as6 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
(2) . y/y = g(y0, n, s, A)
with partial derivatives g1<0, g2<0, g3>0, g4>0 [Mankiw et al., 1992]. A caveat is in
order. The overall productivity factor is usually assumed to produce positive mar-
ginal returns for growth inasmuch as it captures the impact of technology. However,
for the purpose of this study it also captures the effects of sociopolitical factors that
might either favor or reduce growth. Specifically:
(3) A = A(regime type, regime stability, initial level of political rights,
initial democratic capital, human capital, economic freedom)
I hypothesize that all partial derivatives are positive, provided that regime type
is democratic. This extended version of the neoclassical growth model assumes that
the neoclassical variables (y0, n, s, A) augmented with sociopolitical factors determine
the rate of growth of the economy in the process of convergence toward the steady-
state level of income.
Methodology of Estimation
The existing evidence is disparate enough to warrant legitimate concerns about
the robustness of findings regarding the interaction between the political economy
and economic growth. More generally, serious doubts have been expressed with re-
spect to the validity of an entire class of studies that have drawn more or less definite
conclusions about the mechanisms of long-run growth on the basis of empirical link-
ages obtained through cross-country regressions. An extensive literature has come
up with over 50 theoretically acceptable economic policy, political, and institutional
explanatory variables. However, each study ignores the vast majority of such vari-
ables to consider only a very few, if not just one. To say the least, this does not help
achieve certainty as to what drives economic growth. As Levine and Renelt [1992]
noted, most policy indicators utilized by researchers have a fragile relationship with
long-run economic growth. The relationships lack robustness, and specific factors would
lose significance in the presence of small alterations in other factors. They propose
the use of a variant of Leamer’s [1983] extreme-bounds analysis to assess the robust-
ness of results obtained from cross-section analyses. This study’s methodology for
estimation of the model follows from their approach.
The empirical counterpart of the extended neoclassical model (equation 2) is as
follows:
(4) . y/y =  1N +  2P +  3Z + u
where N is a vector comprised of a subset of variables that are generally included in
growth regressions because they are theoretically important for growth: for the pur-
pose of this paper, such variables are the basic neoclassical regressors (y0, n, s); P is a
vector including the subset of variables of interest: the proxies for regime type,
sociopolitical stability, initial level of political rights, and initial democratic capital; Z7 DEMOCRACY AND GROWTH: A RELATIONSHIP REVISITED
is a vector of variables that have, according to the literature, displayed a significant
relationship with growth: the proxies for economic freedom and human capital, along
with a number of regional dummies; and u is an error term.
The empirical analysis is conducted in the form of a sensitivity analysis. Because
the N-variables are usually accounted for, I focus on examining the effects of the P-
and Z-variables on growth. The coefficients for the neoclassical (N) and political (P)
variables are estimated first (Table 2), followed by estimations where various combi-
nations of the other growth-related (Z) variables are added (Table 3). The relation-
ship between the political structure and growth will be considered as robust if, inde-
pendent of variations in the choice of other growth-related variables included in dif-
ferent versions of the regression, the political variables remain statistically signifi-
cant while carrying the theoretically expected signs [De Haan and Siermann, 1998].
Moreover, of importance to the analysis is the use of the other variables (Z-factors) as
instrumental variables to correct for potential endogeneity problems. Although,
endogeneity should not be a major problem, particularly as it is typically less severe
in cross-sectional regressions with a length of period similar to this paper’s [Fischer,
1993]. Nevertheless, in the case of investment, given widely expressed endogeneity
concerns in the literature, the empirical analysis will perform a test to that effect.
The variables comprised in the three vectors are listed below (see Appendix B for
further details and sources).
Neoclassical variables (N). The neoclassical variables include: starting level of
real GDP per capita, population growth, and physical capital investment.
Political variables (P). There are five political variables: two representing re-
gime type, two representing the political heritage, and one representing sociopolitical
instability. They are constructed from the index of political rights of The Annual Sur-
vey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties [Gastil and Freedom House, annual since
1972]. I utilize the Gastil scale in its original format with 7 scores labeled from 1 to 7
to convey the level of political freedom of countries, from most democratic (a score of
1) to most autocratic (a score of 7). This methodology is contrary to other studies that
have converted the Gastil scale linearly to 0-1. Using the unaltered 1-7 scale makes it
easier to intuitively relate this study’s implications to any country’s political reality,
based directly on its Gastil ranking (no need to decipher the corresponding Gastil
score of any freedom level expressed in the 0-1 scale).
The five political variables include the proxy for regime type, and its quadratic
specification. They comprise also the measure of the extent of political rights at the
beginning of the sample period (a measure of initial political endowment), and an
indicator of initial democratic capital. The last political variable is the proxy for
sociopolitical instability (which indicates the absence of stability). This proxy is the
standard deviation of the Gastil political rights series. It is conceptually different
from other proxies proposed in the literature, such as the number of revolutions,
attempted coups d’état, political assassinations, and executive turnover [Londregan
and Poole, 1990; Barro, 1991; Alesina et al., 1996]. This analysis finds these usual







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.9 DEMOCRACY AND GROWTH: A RELATIONSHIP REVISITED
variability of the Gastil series, this proxy is more likely than its competitors to reflect
the effect of stability-disturbing events that are not as obvious as revolutions or ex-
ecutive turnover. Methodologically, Freedom House’s 7-class political rights series is
derived to capture the impact on the sociopolitical environment of each nation sur-
veyed of all “real world situations caused by state and nongovernmental factors” [Gastil
and Freedom House, 2000, 582]. The availability of seven classes to rank countries
(instead of only two or three) allows the survey more flexibility to render nuances in
the status of political freedom across nations.7 Similarly, this flexibility makes it pos-
sible for the survey to reflect moderate year-to-year fluctuations in freedom within a
nation by allowing a democratic (or autocratic) regime to oscillate between adjacent
classes.8 In the limit, the standard deviation is a valid assessor of this activity that, at
higher intensity, is viewed as indicating higher instability.9
Other variables (Z). Other variables related to growth include the proxy for
economic freedom, and its quadratic specification; proxies for low-level and high-level
human capital; and the regional dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America
and the Caribbean, North Africa and the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, and
North America and Europe.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 1 provides a description of simple correlations between the main variables.
The first column shows the correlations between growth and neoclassical and institu-
tional variables. The outcomes are as expected. Democracy, initial democratic capi-
tal, economic freedom, and human capital are positively associated with growth. On
the contrary, political instability and population growth are negatively correlated
with all the other variables, but are positively correlated with each other. The high
positive correlation between democracy and initial democratic capital (0.784) points
to the persistence of democracy, and supports the hypothesis that a significant demo-
cratic endowment at the start of the sample period is associated with significant lev-
els of political rights in subsequent years. A similarly strong positive correlation ex-
ists between democracy and initial income (0.764), and between democracy and basic
or low-level human capital (0.712). These strong correlations, which are all statisti-
cally significant, provide insight into growth-impacting mechanisms in the model.
For instance, democracy correlates positively with physical capital investment (0.591)
which itself is positively associated with growth (0.499), suggesting that democracy
correlates positively with growth both directly (efficiency effect with correlation at
0.286) and indirectly through investment (accumulation effect with correlation at
0.591).
Impact of Regime Type, Regime Stability, and Initial Democratic Capital
Table 2 presents five linear and quadratic specifications of equation (2). Regres-
sion (1) is the basic neoclassical growth regression with initial income, investment in
physical capital, and population growth as independent variables. Its results are con-10 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
sistent with the theory. All three variables are strongly statistically significant. With
regard to conditional convergence, initial income is negatively related to growth, as is
population growth. Investment in physical capital substantially fosters growth: an
increase in the rate of investment by 10 percent of GDP would have caused an in-
crease in average GDP growth by 2 percent. This would have been the performance of
countries like Congo, Guatemala, and Sri Lanka (their investment level was around
10 percent of GDP in the 1970s and 1980s) if they had achieved the level of physical
capital accumulation of countries like Togo, Brazil, and Indonesia (which invested 20
percent of GDP, approximately).
When added to the standard model, the regime-type indicator variable is statis-
tically significant (regression 2). The negative sign of the coefficient of regime type
points to detrimental effects of authoritarianism on the pace of economic activity. A
country that went from one Gastil score to the next, while moving away from the
democratic end (Gastil’s 1) and towards the authoritarian end (Gastil’s 7), would re-
duce its average rate of growth by one-fourth of one percentage point. Inversely,
progress in the opposite direction (from 7 toward 1, that is, toward more democracy or
less authoritarianism) would favor growth to the same extent, ceteris paribus. Pre-
sumably, countries like Cameroon, Chile, and Syria (which had an average Gastil
score of 6 in the sample period) would have grown by an additional 1 percent, had
they fostered political rights to ascend to the freedom status of countries like Botswana,
TABLE 2
Impact of Regime Type, Regime Stability, and
Initial Democratic Capital
(Dependent Variable: GDP Growth)
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5)
STARTGDP       1.51a  1.82a  1.74a  1.66a  1.41a
(0.31) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)         (0.34)
POP  0.79a  0.69a  0.79a -0.86a  0.92a
(0.22) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
INVEST  0.20a 0.19a 0.18a 0.17a 0.16a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
REGTYPE   —  0.26b           0.62   1.44a 2.06a
(0.13) (0.41) (0.66) (0.64)
Q_REGTYPE  —  —       0.11b  0.21a  0.29a
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
INSTABILITY     —     —      —  0.75b       1.16a
(0.38) (0.40)
STARTPOL      —      —      —      — 0.55b
(0.24)
STARTDEMOC      —      —      —      —  2.32a
(0.89)
 
R2  0.39  0.41      0.43      0.45      0.48
Variable definitions and sources are presented in Appendix B. Regressions are estimated by ordinary
least squares. Significance levels are indicated by a and b, which  denote 1 percent and  5 percent levels of
significance, respectively. Estimated heteroskedasticity-consistent [White, 1980] standard errors are in
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the Dominican Republic, and India (whose average Gastil score was 2). This result,
however, casts doubt on the linearity of the democracy/growth linkage. Moving from
a Gastil score of 6 to a Gastil score of 2 (a substantial change in political freedom)
would generate only a one percentage point increase in growth rate. Also, this evolu-
tion would most likely come with a surge of instability, which would defeat the under-
lying other things equal assumption. Hence the need of a better specification for the
model.
The addition of the quadratic specification of regime type provides evidence that
the relationship between growth and regime type in fact may not be linear (regres-
sion 3). The political economy is likely to affect economic performance differently,
depending on the stage of economic development. Interestingly, in regression (3) re-
gime type loses statistical significance in the presence of its statistically significant
quadratic version. This outcome may signal that nonlinearity actually dominates the
underlying relationship. The negative sign of the coefficient on the quadratic specifi-
cation of regime type suggests that regime type gives rise to declining marginal re-
turns for economic growth—more democracy leads to more growth, but at a dimin-
ishing rate.
With the inclusion of the indicator of instability (regression 4), the explanatory
power of the model and the statistical significance of the two regime-type proxies are
strengthened. The presence of sociopolitical instability contributes to stronger effects
of regime type on growth, as evidenced by the doubling of the size of the coefficients
on regime type and its quadratic form from regression (3) to regression (4). Regres-
sion (5) adds initial levels of political rights and democratic capital to the model. The
variable for the initial level of political rights captures the extent to which people
benefited from political freedom at the start of the sample period (1972), without
differentiating between democratic and authoritarian regimes. It is a measure of
initial political endowment. The variable for initial democratic capital is a binary
regressor that splits the sample countries into two groups in 1972—democratic and
non-democratic (the latter being the omitted category). The purpose of this variable
is to show whether a tradition of democracy helped countries do better economically.
Regression (5) brings the analysis of the impact on growth of components of the
political economy to completeness. All political variables (P) are now allowed to work
together to exert their effects on growth. The findings support the hypothesis that
comprehensiveness of specification is necessary to capture appropriately the effect of
the sociopolitical context on economic performance. As set forth by this study, the
nonlinearity of the growth/regime-type relationship, the stability of the sociopolitical
system, and the relative size of the stock of initial democratic capital appear essen-
tial. Regression (5)’s outcome is illustrated in Figure 1 which shows an inverted U-
curve relationship between growth and regime type. Growth tops out at a level of
political rights of about 3 (which was the freedom level of countries like Malaysia and
Turkey), and declines when democracy further expands to levels 2 and 1, the highest
degrees of political freedom allowed by the Freedom House scale.
The explanatory power of the model is reinforced, with an improvement in ad-
justed R-square from 39 percent in regression (1) to 48 percent in regression (5). The
size of the coefficients of the political variables expands. A worsening impact on the
pace of growth due to sociopolitical unrest is evident with the increase in12 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
INSTABILITY’s coefficient from  0.75 in regression (4) to  1.16 in regression (5),
and with an increase in the confidence level from 5 percent to 1 percent. According to
regression (5), a democratic legacy bodes well for economic prosperity: the point esti-
mate of the coefficient on STARTDEMOC implies that, compared to their authoritar-
ian counterparts, countries that were democracies in the early 1970s subsequently
grew by an additional 2.3 percentage points.
Testing for Robustness
This part of the analysis tests the robustness of the results obtained thus far.
Table 3 shows the outcome of further augmenting the model with different combina-
tions of the Z-variables.
Economic freedom is shown to foster growth (regression 6), holding all three char-
acteristics of the political economy constant. An improvement in standing by three
points within the 1-to-10 economic freedom scale would have caused the average
sample country to grow in the period by an additional 1 percent, approximately. This
would require that countries like Benin, Jamaica, Colombia, and Pakistan (average
economic freedom level of 4) to have been on a par with countries like Belgium,
Panama, Singapore, and Malaysia (level 7). Regression (7) adds the quadratic speci-
fication of economic freedom, and displays an outcome similar to that of regressions
(4) and (5). As in the case of democracy, economic freedom maintains a nonlinear
relationship with growth, and gives rise to declining marginal returns for growth—
more economic freedom increases the capacity of the economy to expand, but it does
so at a diminishing rate.
In regressions (8) to (10), the proxies for low-level human capital and high-level
human capital are added first alternately, then simultaneously. Regression (10) proves
to be a somewhat better specification. Low-level human capital remains statistically
FIGURE 1
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insignificant but high-level human capital achieves statistical significance with the
expected positive sign. This is evidence of the potentially important relationship that
exists between the specific type of human capital and economic growth. The accumu-
lation of low-level human capital does not seem to warrant the development of skills
needed to influence growth in significant ways. This is consistent with the statistical
record of fairly poor economic performance of countries with a large stock of mostly
TABLE 3
Testing for Robustness
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth
     (6)      (7)      (8)      (9)    (10)    (11)    (12)
STARTGDP   1.47a   1.34a   1.29a   1.51a   1.38a   1.28a   1.38a
(0.31) (0.33) (0.36) (0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.40)
POP   0.92a   0.90a       0.94a    0.93a   1.16a   0.82a   0.88a
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.26) (0.20) (0.25)
INVEST 0.14a 0.14a 0.14a 0.14a 0.15a 0.11a 0.11a
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
REGTYPE 2.15a 2.24a 2.24a 2.37a 2.48a 2.13a  1.69a
(0.62) (0.64) (0.63) (0.64) (0.64) (0.59) (0.55)
Q_REGTYPE   0.30a   0.32a   0.32a   0.33a   0.34a   0.30a    0.25a
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
INSTABILITY   1.14a   1.18a   1.19a   1.20a   1.27a   0.75b   0.80b
(0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37) (0.38) (0.39)
STARTPOL 0.58a 0.60a 0.60a 0.62a 0.62a 0.58a 0.58a
(0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.24)
STARTDEMOC 2.22a 2.26a 2.26a 2.34a 2.42a 2.39a 2.14a
(0.88) (0.88) (0.87) (0.91) (0.92) (0.84) (0.86)
ECONFREE 0.37a 1.71b 1.71b 1.77b 1.83a 1.93a 1.79a
(0.14) (0.73) (0.73) (0.72) (0.72) (0.77) (0.72)
Q_ECONFREE     —       0.14c   0.14c    0.15b    0.15b    0.16b   0.15b
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
LOWHUMCAP     —     —     0.05  -    0.26    0.16    0.12
(0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10)
HIGHHUMCAP   —     —     —    0.05 0.10b 0.06  0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
SUB-SAHAFRICA     —    —     —     —     —       1.00b     —
(0.51)
LATAMERICA-     —     —     —    —     —   1.68a     —
CARIB (0.43)
NTHAFRICA-    —     —     —     —    —     — 1.66a
MIDEAST (0.56)
ASIA-PACIFIC     —    —     —     —     —     — 1.59a
(0.48)
NTHAMERICA-    —     —    —     —     —    —       1.09b
EUROPE (0.50)
 
R2    0.51    0.53    0.52    0.53    0.54    0.62    0.61
Variable definitions and sources are presented in Appendix B. Regressions are estimated by ordinary
least squares. Significance levels are indicated by a, b, and c, which denote 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10
percent levels of significance, respectively. Estimated heteroskedasticity-consistent [White, 1980] stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. To ensure an easier consultation of the table, two horizontal lines separate
the N, P, and Z groups of variables from one another.14 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
low-level human capital. In contrast, countries with a larger stock of high-level hu-
man capital (college level and beyond) are shown to have higher rates of growth.
Nonetheless, the two variables seem to be mutually reinforcing since high-level hu-
man capital achieves statistical significance only when the model includes low-level
human capital. This may reflect the fact that basic schooling, although not sufficient
in itself to sustain growth, is the foundation upon which higher schooling must rest.
Every additional percentage point of higher schooling attained in the population
would have contributed to higher growth by one-tenth of one percentage point. As a
result, if countries like Algeria, Senegal, Bangladesh or Haiti (on average, only 1
percent of their population had access to higher schooling) had managed to allocate
resources to achieve the level of higher schooling of countries like Denmark, the Phil-
ippines or Sweden (at least 11 percent), they would have fostered their average pace
of economic expansion by 1 percent. Furthermore, those countries could have grown
by another percentage point if they had emulated countries such as Canada, Israel,
and New Zealand (21 percent). Indeed, results based on these proxies for human
capital should be received with caution. For one thing, they are not particularly ro-
bust. Also, one can argue that investment in human capital includes more than for-
mal schooling. Human capital also includes on-the-job training, various skills, knowl-
edge, health characteristics, and habits of the population [Becker, 1994]. In addition,
number of years of schooling does not reflect the quality of schooling that arguably
may be more important a catalyst of economic growth. These attributes are not in-
cluded in the two proxies used in this research.
The remaining regressions of Table 3 control for region-specific effects in the
growth model. These regressions regroup the sample countries into two major cat-
egories.10 Regression (11) shows lower growth associated with countries located in
the first group (the Sub-Saharan African region, and the Latin American and Carib-
bean regions). On the contrary, regression (12) suggests that location is beneficial for
economic prosperity for countries in the second group (North Africa and the Middle
East, Asia and the Pacific, and North America and Europe). Hence the model identi-
fies continent fixed effects in the form of specific growth-impacting features within
each group. The literature customarily assumes these features to be related to the
effectiveness of region-specific policy making, in addition to factors such as regional
endowments of natural resources, regional business cycle fluctuations, cultural at-
tributes, and so on.
A closer look at the results in the last two regressions points to the efficiency of
resource allocation (investment in physical capital) and sociopolitical stability as two
channels of the impact of the political economy in those continents on growth. The
estimated coefficients on investment in physical capital lose more than one-fourth of
their magnitude in regressions (11) and (12), compared to regression (10)––from 0.15
in regression (10) to 0.11 in both regressions (11) and (12). At the same time, the
coefficient on sociopolitical instability declines by almost half––from  1.3 in regres-
sion (10) to  0.8 in both regressions (11) and (12). However, the implications from
these results cannot be drawn without pertinent interpretation of the signs of the
coefficients on the regional dummies. Such interpretation varies sensibly, depending
on which group of countries one controls for. For the first group in regression (11), the15 DEMOCRACY AND GROWTH: A RELATIONSHIP REVISITED
negative regional dummy coefficients point to lower growth (possibly through lower
investment and higher instability). For the second group in regression (12), the posi-
tive regional dummy coefficients indicate higher growth (possibly through higher
investment and lower instability).
The outcome from regressions (11) and (12) suggests a more important role for
investment than assumed by the neoclassical growth model. For the latter, invest-
ment comes from an exogenous saving rate and is measured as a ratio of GDP. How-
ever, many studies find evidence that, besides the positive impact of an exogenously
determined investment ratio on growth, there might exist a positive association be-
tween the two factors whereby growth opportunities would favor investment [Barro,
1996; Mankiw et al., 1992]. What are the implications for this study, in terms of pos-
sible endogeneity of investment? A new run of regressions (11) and (12) is executed
without investment in physical capital INVEST (not reported in Table 3). This leads
to a reduction in adjusted R-square by six percent, and a moderate increase in the
magnitude of the coefficients on sociopolitical instability, initial political rights, and
the regional dummies. But the essential findings from the empirical analysis are not
altered in any significant manner.
The purpose in this sub-section was to assert the statistical soundness of the
empirical outcomes of the political variables. The aim was to establish the credibility
of the results from Table 2 that found that the political (P) variables were believable
causal channels for economic growth. The seven regressions in Table 3 allowed for
variations in the conditioning of the model. Regardless of the other (Z) variables or
the combination of other (Z) variables utilized to augment the final political economy
model of regression (5), all political proxies remained strongly statistically signifi-
cant. They consistently maintained robustness, even when investment in physical
capital is not included, while the explanatory power of the model augmented in a
steady fashion. This lends credence to the hypotheses set forth in this research re-
garding the three features that were assumed critical in understanding the interac-
tion between the political structure and economic performance.
CONCLUSION
This paper aimed to analyze underlying mechanisms by which components of the
political economy influence economic growth. It posited that the sociopolitical envi-
ronment exhibits various characteristics that, to the extent that the data available
allow, should be accounted for if there is to be a credible explanation about the rela-
tionship between that environment and growth. This analysis innovated with the
introduction of the concept of initial democratic capital, arguing that the political
makeup in the sample period may be better understood if the political legacy from
previous years is also considered. The results of the empirical analysis supported
that proposition, along with the hypotheses that democratic types of political regime
are more favorable for economic prosperity, that a nonlinear relationship exists be-
tween growth and regime type, and that sociopolitical stability is a necessary comple-
mentary condition.16 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Are the partial effects generated by this investigation strong enough to warrant
valid policy implications regarding the political economy of economic growth? Ac-
cording to the test for robustness conducted through the other growth-related (Z)
variables, they are. An interesting corollary of that sensitivity analysis pointed to
the importance of economic freedom and human capital. Consistent with the existing
literature, their promotion should be regarded as another desirable feature of policy
making in promoting economic expansion.
Where does this research leave the discussion over the impact of regime type on
growth? Has its novel perspective to approach the sociopolitical environment suc-
ceeded in putting that debate to rest? I will certainly not go that far. Despite the
robustness of results obtained for a sample period that I purposely chose to overlap
that of many existing studies, the disparity of outcomes in the literature remains
puzzling. Before definite conclusions can be reached, a comprehensive review of the
literature seems necessary. The latter should go beyond the usual reporting of diverg-
ing results to analyze variations in the methodology used by each study either to
depict the features of the political system or to conduct the empirical analysis.
Apart from the positive impact of democracy on a nation’s material welfare, a
valid moral argument also can be made regarding the intrinsic desirability of democ-
racy, as one political system that upholds political freedom and nurtures civil liber-
ties. By empowering the citizenry through enfranchisement and the respect of the
rights of the individual with respect to the state and the larger social group, democ-
racy stands as a prerequisite of social justice. Another extension of the research can
be to expand the period of study to include the 1990s, a decade where the dramatic
gains recorded for political freedom in the 1980s continued. It would therefore be
interesting to determine whether the substantial strides made by democracy through-
out the world in the last decade of the twentieth century were accompanied by im-
proved economic performance.
NOTES
The author wishes to thank the editor of this Journal and two anonymous referees for very helpful
comments on an earlier version of this paper. The author assumes responsibility for the paper’s
contents.
1. Surveys of the empirical literature on the relationship between democracy and growth can be found
in Kormendi and Meguire [1985], Barro [1991], De Haan and Siermann [1995], and Ali [1997].
2. The choice of time period (1972-1989) is dictated by data availability, in addition to the logic of
conducting this analysis in a period similar to that of previous research so that the results can be
compared. 1972 is retained as the sample’s first year because this is the first year for which the
sociopolitical data utilized here became available.
3. The choice of countries to include in the sample is dictated by simultaneous availability of the vari-
ous categories of data utilized in the empirical analysis. Appendix A presents the list of retained
countries.
4. By comparison, the French colonization tended to exhibit a lack of permeability. Many French colo-
nies did not seem to have enjoyed a significant opportunity to learn administrative skills and demo-
cratic principles from their rulers. This was the case even during the French Revolution (the 1790s),
a time of sweeping changes in the French sociopolitical environment. Every effort was made to insu-
late the colonies and nullify possible contagious effects of the revolution there. That effort failed in
the case of one of the most prosperous French colonies, Saint Domingue (on the island of Hispaniola17 DEMOCRACY AND GROWTH: A RELATIONSHIP REVISITED
in the Caribbean). Propelled at the time in part by the course of events in France, that colony went
ahead with its own revolution to declare independence in 1804 under the name of Republic of Haiti.
That model spurred, and the new nation occasionally supported, a wave of emancipatory events in
the Caribbean and Latin America throughout the nineteenth century.
5. A desirable endeavor would be to consider alternative proxies for initial democratic capital. An ap-
pealing candidate is the number of years a country was democratic in the two or three decades before
the sample period began. However, data limitations make this difficult to use as a measure of initial
democratic capital in the context of the period studied. Nonetheless, intuitively, the 1972 level of
democracy adopted here is an acceptable indicator of initial democratic capital. History suggests that
countries (such as those in the OECD) that were consistently democratic in the post-World War II
years also tended to do better economically in the 1970s and 1980s than their authoritarian counter-
parts. That observation is congruent with this study’s hypothesis about the relevance of initial demo-
cratic capital for growth.
6. The number of revolutions and attempted coups d’état are likely to miss the impact of activities that
effectively disturb stability without actually succeeding in removing the government or attempting
to do so. These include the weakening of the government because of systematic rejection of its bills by
the parliament; frequent street demonstrations by the opposition or by pressure groups; and so on.
Similarly, political assassinations and executive turnover are likely to allow only for a partial assess-
ment of instability. A political system may be inherently unstable in the absence of high executive
turnover, and frequent changes of government do not necessarily imply a high level of instability.
For instance, Italy remained a stable democracy despite experiencing over fifty governments in the
four decades following World War II. This is captured by the proxy for sociopolitical stability that
stands for Italy at 0.44, a relatively low score compared to the proxy’s mean value for the entire
sample (0.61) and to the scores of Greece (1.65) and Argentina (2.02), two countries that were much
less stable in the sample period.
7. For example, countries with a score of 1 and countries with a score of 2 are all “free”, but the latter
(India, for example) are somewhat less democratic that the former (Canada). Countries with a score
of 6 and countries with a score of 7 are all “not free”, but the latter (Benin) are somewhat more
authoritarian than the former (Algeria).
8. For example, Italy was a democracy in the sample period but it alternately scored 1 and 2 from one
year to another; Haiti was an autocracy but it alternately scored 6 and 7. The three intermediate
classes (3, 4, and 5) provide even more flexibility in categorizing mixed regimes.
9. However, this variable fails in cases where a country remained in the same class throughout the
sample period (total absence of variability). A country that experienced repeated coups but remained
authoritarian at either 6 or 7, exclusively, would be wrongly represented as stable due to a standard
deviation of zero. Interestingly, this happens to only one of the eighty-two retained countries: Benin.
Other countries that would be in the same case were dropped from a larger sample for lack of one or
more categories of data (Gabon, Guinea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, the former Czechoslovakia, and
Somalia). Except for Benin, the sociopolitical stability variable does contribute in measuring fluctua-
tions in political freedom resulting from the inherent dynamism of a political system.
10. Due to the presence of an intercept in the model, including all five regional dummy variables at once
in the same regression would result in perfect multicollinearity, and the regression could not be run.
This is avoided by omitting one or some of the dummy variables in any individual regression [Kennedy,
1998, 222]. The choice of dummies to regroup together is based on the historical evidence about
similarities in growth performance.18 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
APPENDIX B
DATA: DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES
The sample period covers the 1970s and the 1980s (precisely: 1972-1989).
The three neoclassical variables are from Penn World Table [Summers and Heston,
1991]. They are:
STARTGDP (y0) is the logarithm of the PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita at the
start of the sample period, i.e. in 1972.
POP (n) is the average growth rate of population in the sample period.
INVEST (s) is the average level of investment in physical capital in the sample
period, measured in percentage of GDP.
The five sociopolitical variables are from the index of political rights of The An-
nual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties [Gastil and Freedom House, an-
nual since 1972]. The survey has been extensively utilized in the literature to mea-
sure the levels of political and civil freedoms. It uses a scale of 1 to 7, where scores of
1 and 2 indicate the most democratic regimes (“free” by the survey’s nomenclature),
APPENDIX A
Sample Countries
Sub-Saharan North Africa Latin America North America Asia
Africa & the Middle East & the Caribbean & Europe & the Pacific
1- Benin 21- Algeria 28- Costa Rica 48- Canada 69- Bangladesh
2- Botswana 22- Egypt 29- Dominican Republic 49- Mexico 70- India
3- Cameroon 23- Tunisia 30- El Salvador 50- USA 71- Indonesia
4- Central African Rep 24- Iran 31- Guatemala 51- Austria 72- Japan
5- Congo 25- Israel 32- Haiti 52- Belgium 73- Korea (South)
6- Ghana 26- Jordan 33- Honduras 53- Denmark 74- Malaysia
7- Kenya 27- Syria 34- Jamaica 54- Finland 75- Pakistan
8- Malawi 35- Nicaragua 55- France 76- Philippines
9- Mali 36- Panama 56- Germany 77- Singapore
10- Mauritius 37- Trinidad & Tobago 57- Greece 78- Sri Lanka
11- Niger 38- Argentina 58- Hungary 79- Taiwan
12- Rwanda 39- Bolivia 59- Ireland 80- Thailand
13- Senegal 40- Brazil 60- Italy 81- Australia
14- Sierra Leone 41- Chile 61- Netherlands 82- New Zealand
15- South Africa 42- Colombia 62- Norway
16- Togo 43- Ecuador 63- Portugal
17- Uganda 44- Paraguay 64- Spain
18- Zaire 45- Peru 65- Sweden
19- Zambia 46- Uruguay 66- Switzerland
20- Zimbabwe 47- Venezuela 67- Turkey
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scores of 3, 4, and 5 indicate mixed regimes (“partly free” or semi-democratic), and
scores of 6 and 7 indicate authoritarian regimes (“not free” or nondemocratic). This
approach conceptualizes regime type along a continuum where democracy (1) and
autocracy (7) occupy the two extremes. Thus, democracy is viewed analytically as the
opposite of autocracy. For more details about methodological issues, see the 1999-
2000 survey.
The five sociopolitical variables are:
REGTYPE is a proxy for regime type. It is the average level of political rights,
that is, the mean of the Gastil political rights series for the 1970s and 1980s. The
higher REGTYPE is (that is, the closer it is to 7, the authoritarian bound), the
lower the level of political rights is, and the least democratic the system is. Hence
the expectation of a negative sign for REGTYPE. This variable is essentially a
proxy for autocracy (regime types located closer to the “7” extreme) and, inversely,
for democracy (regime types located closer to the “1” extreme).
Q_REGTYPE is a quadratic specification of REGTYPE, aimed to capture
nonlinearity effects in the relationship between growth and regime type.
INSTABILITY is a proxy for sociopolitical instability. Due to the practical diffi-
culty of exactly assessing instability, I use the standard deviation of the Gastil
political rights series. The more spread out a country’s political rights series was
in the period under study (that is, the more variability it exhibited around its
central value), the more that country moved from one score to another within the
Gastil scale, the less stable it was due to structural inability to settle down any-
where within the 7-score spectrum.
STARTPOL captures every country’s initial level of Gastil political rights (that
is, in 1972). It helps to determine whether it makes sense to account for the
extent of political rights at the start of the period.
STARTDEMOC is the indicator of initial democratic capital. It is a dummy vari-
able capturing the initial level of democracy (that is, the level of democracy in
1972). The sample is split so as to include two broad Gastil classes of countries in
1972: democratic regimes (STARTDEMOC=1 if 1=STARTPOL<=3), and nondemo-
cratic regimes (STARTDEMOC=0 if 4=>STARTPOL=7). The democratic thresh-
old is thus set at 3. A “natural” threshold would be “2” (recall that Gastil/Free-
dom House classifies 1-2 countries as free, 3-5 countries as partly free, and 6-7
countries as not free). I set the cutoff score at 3 to remain consistent with the
survey which includes in the “free” group countries achieving an average score of
up to 2.5 for the political rights ratings and the civil liberties ratings taken to-
gether (2 in political rights and 3 in civil liberties, or 3 in political rights and 2 in
civil liberties; Freedom House, 1999-2000, 588). Also, using a cutoff score of 3 is
consistent with the empirical analysis: 3 is the score at which growth reaches its
highest potential (depicted in Figure 1).20 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
The data for economic freedom are from Economic Freedom of the World, 1975-
1995 [Gwartney, Lawson and Block, 1996]. Two variables are constructed using that
survey:
ECONFREE is a 1-to-10 scale. A score of 1 indicates the lowest average level of
economic freedom, and a score of 10 the highest level, in the sample period.
Q_ECONFREE is a quadratic specification of ECONFREE, aimed to capture
nonlinearity effects in the relationship between growth and economic freedom.
The data for human capital are from International Comparisons of Educational
Attainment [Barro and Lee, 1993]. Two variables are constructed from that dataset:
LOWHUMCAP, or low-level human capital, is the percentage of the total popula-
tion that achieved basic schooling.
HIGHHUMCAP, or high-level human capital, is the percentage of the total popu-
lation that achieved higher schooling (formal education at college level and be-
yond).
A number of regional dummies are used:
SUB-SAHAFRICA: Sub-Saharan Africa.
LATAMERICA-CARIB: Latin America and the Caribbean.
NTHAFRICA-MIDEAST: North Africa and the Middle East.
ASIA-PACIFIC: Asia and the Pacific region.
NTHAMERICA-EUROPE: North America and Europe, where most OECD coun-
tries are located.
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